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I've had moral dilemmas on my mind lately, and I'm troubled by a common argument given against the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. I'm hoping people can help diagnose what's troubling me. And I apologize in advance for the disorganized... Michael Cholbi

This is funny. Brian Leiter

In a forthcoming paper, “Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?“, I had occasion to cite James Beebe and Wesley Buckwalter’s admirable forthcoming paper, “The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect,” which reports interesting experimental results about epistemic judgments, related to those reported by Joshua Knobe on intentional action and side effects. There’s a somewhat surprising story behind this, which some people here might find interesting, so I thought I’d share it.

The paper is on the Gettier problem. One thing I do is to present a new argument for the conclusion that Gettier subjects do in fact know. (I don’t ultimately accept this, but the argument is interesting nonetheless.) In making my argument I present cases involving “bad” counterparts of original Gettier subjects. For instance, “Bad Henry” isn’t just gazing at a roadside barn, but out to destroy a barn. He aims his bazooka and fires with deadly accuracy. I say, it’s plausible that Bad Henry knows that he is about to destroy a barn. But to do that, he must know that it is a barn. And if Bad Henry knows that it’s a barn, then so does Good Henry (the protagonist of the original Ginet/Goldman case). So this gives us some reason to mistrust the intuition that Good Henry doesn’t know.

Maybe you buy that; maybe you don’t. But this brings me to my story. One referee for my paper singled out the claim “it’s plausible that Bad Henry knows that he is about to destroy a barn.” It just didn’t seem like that to her or him. The referee then suggested that I run an x-phi experiment to test whether the intuition was widely shared!

This has never happened to me before. Has it happened to others? Will it become a trend? That is, will it become more common for referees to prompt armchair philosophers to run experimental studies to bolster intuitions not shared by referees? Would this be a good development?

I know that the x-phi phenomenon has caused some consternation in some philosophers, but I’m not one of them. I continue to find the results fascinating and I’m happy to see people advancing their research program and enjoying successful academic careers. But at the same time, I don’t think that, in order to get work published, philosophers employing armchair methods should be expected or required to conform to this methodological innovation.

In the present case, I was fortunate that relevant experimental work had been done, and that I happened to become aware of it in time for this R&R. Maybe it was just an isolated incident, and maybe it would have been accepted even if I hadn’t been able to cite that work; but then again, maybe not. Who knows? One thing I do know, though, is that I’m not all that enthusiastic about being handed a clipboard when I’m working hard in the bottomless pit of the armchair.

That's the issue raised, I take it, in this opinion piece by Senator Webb of Virginia, a white quasi-populist Democrat. He ignores the possibility that affirmative action may sometimes operate as a remedy, or prophylactic, against current, conscious or unconscious... Brian Leiter

I recently gave an interview for Big Think on erasing memories Eternal Sunshine-style for their series on “Dangerous Ideas.” They are running this series throughout the month of August, and other people in the series include Stephen Hawking, Noam Chomsky, Richard Posner, and Gary Becker. The entire series, which is still ongoing, can be found [...] 3

Sometime ago, Mike Otsuka (UCL) mentioned here that Derek Parfit will be responding to an article by him and Alex Voorhoeve entitled ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument against the Priority View’ here on Ethics Etc, with further responses from Mike and Alex, once Derek’s book, On What Matters, [...] 0

...though its "impact" on U.S. policy one can predict, with confidence, will be non-existent. (Thanks to Denis Robinson for the pointer.) UPDATE: Mea culpa--I didn't read the whole item, I had assumed from the recommendation (which I may have also... Brian Leiter

. . . the news can be found here. Let's hope Judge Diane Wood is confirmed for the next vacancy . . .

. . . can be found here in a new piece at the Times Higher. Some readers may also be interested in my piece on publishing advice here.

Here (godless) and here (godly). (Thanks to Keith DeRose for the first, and John Mizzoni for the second.) Brian Leiter

A philosopher writes: I think that journals should no longer give revise-and-resubmits. All decisions should be either accept or reject. A journal can certainly send an acceptance that reads "we are pleased to accept your paper, and ask that you... Brian Leiter

. . . from the BBC here.

I understand the news isn't so new anymore, but I can't help congratulating an old friend from happy graduate school days. David Liggins (philosophy of mathematics, philosophical methods) at the University of Manchester is now one of the UK-based associate editors of Australasian Journal Philosophy (see here). Many congrats!

The winner of the APA's Berger Prize is Gideon Yaffe for his article "Excusing Mistakes of Law" (found here and published by The Philosophers' Imprint). The Berger Prize is awarded by the APA's Committee on Philosophy and Law and goes to the best article or chapter in the field of legal philosophy over the last two years. As the Committee Chair, I can confirm that we received several strong submissions that led to some discussions between members in determining the winner, although we all agreed that this piece was the worthy winner. Many congrats, Gideon!

Are any readers convinced? I must say that this appears to me like a thoroughly misinformed understanding of evolution . . .

Details here. Of course, I've been in touch with this judge concerning a different case, concerning shame punishment (see here, subscription-only in Journal of Applied Philosophy).

Problems with Priority?
A one-day conference hosted by the Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT)

19th November 2010
10.30am – 5.30pm
University of Manchester, UK

Speakers
Martin O’Neill (York)
Michael Otsuka (University College London)
Thomas Porter (Manchester)
Alex Voorhoeve (LSE)
Andrew Williams (I.C.R.E.A. and Pompeu Fabra University)

Details
The Priority View is widely seen as a leading alternative to egalitarianism that avoids some of the difficulties associated with the latter. However, in their 2009 Philosophy & Public Affairs article "Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument against the Priority View" (P&PA vol. 37, no. 2), Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve have offered a new argument to show that the Priority View is vulnerable to fatal objection. This conference is devoted to exploration and criticism of that new argument and will include a 'response to critics' session with Otsuka and Voorhoeve.

Registration and further details
http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/events/priority/

Please note: thanks to the Analysis Trust, there are a limited number of subsidised places for graduate students. These places will be allocated on a first come, first served basis.

Contact
Please contact Noémie Rouault (noemie.rouault@manchester.ac.uk) if you have any queries.

Supervenience-based arguments for moral naturalism have tended to apply only to moral properties, not to relations. One might have thought that they could easily be generalised so as to apply to relations as well. However, as I'll argue here, this... Campbell Brown

Supervenience-based arguments for moral naturalism have tended to apply only to moral properties, not to relations. One might have thought that they could easily be generalised so as to apply to relations as well. However, as I'll argue here, this... Campbell Brown

...just explain it was either that or becoming an expert in annoying monkeys (warning: don't tell your kids this is an actual job). (Thanks to Scott Shapiro for a pointer.) Brian Leiter